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The negative impact of noise on the performance of 












Active portfolio management involves trading on forecasts of the future returns of 
securities. The level of trading actually going on in investment portfolios suggests 
large differences between portfolio managers, which indicate differences in 
forecasting abilities. In this paper, we focus on the quality of the forecasting abilities 
by making a distinction between information based trading and noise trading. Most 
performance measures used in the literature ignore this noise-trading component. We 
show that noise trading is harmful to the investor, and we propose to measure noise 
trading in addition to the usual measures of performance. We develop alternative 
measures of noise trading that can be used in empirical research. 
 
Although investment managers increasingly adopt the lessons of modern portfolio 
theory, it is clear that the majority of the market participants are still engaged in active 
investing. There is no reason to suspect that this will change, since efficient markets 
require information-based investors who trade to exploit deviations from market 
efficiency. However, Black [1986] argues that markets with only information-based 
investors cannot exist and he beliefs that noise traders are necessary in order to 
facilitate a liquid market. De Long et al. [1990] use a simple overlapping generations 
model with one risky asset to show that noise traders generate additional risk to a 
market, which allows them to earn a risk premium to remain in the market. In other 
words, the function of noise trading to provide liquidity in a financial market is 
rewarded.  
 
                                                 
*
 Auke Plantinga is associate professor of finance at the University of Groningen, P.O. Box 800, 9700 
AV  Groningen, The Netherlands. This paper benefited from help by Nanne Brunia, Frans Tempelaar 
and Jaap Wierenga, and from suggestions forwarded by participants in a Theme E Seminar of the SOM 
research school of the University of Groningen. 
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Noise trading in the sense of De Long et al. [1990] refers to information relating to the 
‘true’ value of the risky asset. There are numerous data sources available that may 
reveal information on the true value of risky assets. However, in practice it may be 
difficult for active investors to separate relevant information from irrelevant 
information regarding the true value of a risky asset1. Therefore it is likely that 
investors may trade on noise. In this paper we develop methods to measure the degree 
of noise trading in a portfolio. We define a noisy signal n as a signal that does not bear 
any relation with future return realizations r: 
 ( ) 0,cov =nr .        (1) 
 
Our measure of noise is different from that of De Long et al., since they focus on a 
definition of noise relative to the fundamental or true value of a security and our 
measure refers to the future price of the security, which may be affected by the 
behavior of noise traders. Knowing that the market price of a stock is affected both by 
its fundamental value and the behavior of noise traders, successful portfolio 
management also involves the forecasting of the future behavior of these noise traders. 
 
In this paper we analyze the impact of noisy signals on performance measures. We 
extend earlier work by for example, Dybvig and Ross [1985] and Grinblatt and 
Titman [1989,1993]. This earlier work focused on the ability of performance measures 
to detect forecasting abilities of portfolio managers in the presence of informative 
signals. Within the context of the Dybvig and Ross model, we show that the standard 
deviation of portfolio weights is also a measure of the forecasting skills of a portfolio 
manager. Furthermore, we propose a new measure, the so-called signal measure that 
measures the forecasting skills of portfolio managers irrespective of their risk 
aversion. Next, we introduce portfolio managers that act also on noisy signals. This 
analysis is based on an extended version of the Dybvig and Ross [1985] model of 
asymmetric information. We show the impact of noisy signal on the outcomes of 
performance measures. Furthermore, we develop measures explicitly focusing on the 
detection of noise in portfolio.  
 
The paper is structured as follow. First we present the model of Dybvig and Ross and 
some of their results on performance measures. Next, we extend their model by 
allowing for noisy signals. Based on this extended model we provide some insights on 
the potential damage of noise trading on a portfolio’s performance as well as the 
consequences for Jensen’s alpha. We investigate methods for measuring the degree of 
noise trading based on empirical data and propose a method for measuring the level of 
informative trading and noise trading in a portfolio. 
 
                                                 
1
 The use of the term ‘irrelevant information’ is of course a contradiction in terms. 




Dybvig and Ross [1985] use a model of asymmetric information to study the ability 
of performance measures to detect managers with forecasting abilities. The basic idea 
in their model is that the informed manager can predict a part of the future return of a 
security. An important characteristic of this model is that the manager receives 
valuable signals that are not affected by noise. In this model, the return from the 
perspective of an uninformed manager is: 
u epr +=         (2) 
 
where p is the risk premium and eu is the uncertainty regarding the normally 
distributed returns of the risky asset with expectation zero and variance 2
ue
σ . From the 
perspective of the informed manager, the return on a security is equal to  
iespr ++= ,        (3) 
 
where s reflects the signal received by the manager. The signal s has a normal 
distribution with expectation zero and variance 2sσ . This signal allows him to adjust 
his expected return. The informed investor differs from the uninformed investor with 
respect to his expectations regarding the risky asset. From the perspective of the 
informed investor, the expected return on a security is p + s and the risk on a security 
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Dybvig and Ross used this model to investigate the properties of risk-adjusted 
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Based on this expression, Dybvig and Ross conclude that Jensen’s alpha is 
inappropriate for evaluating the performance of portfolio managers, since the 
expression could become negative, even if the manager has forecasting skills. This 
occurs if the risk premium exceeds the standard deviation of the risky asset. Another 
observation is that the outcome of Jensen’s alpha is determined by the risk aversion of 
the investor. This means that differences in alphas do not necessarily imply that the 
managers have different forecasting abilities. 
 
The model of Dybvig and Ross [1985] is rather optimistic on the nature of the 
forecasting skills of the manager. All the information obtained by the manager is 
relevant, and the manager will never trade on signal without information. A 
consequence is that all changes in the manager’s portfolio are directly related to his 
forecasting skills. The measurement problem as identified by Dybvig and Ross can be 






σ = .        (8) 
 
The standard deviation of portfolio weights highlights the implications of ignoring the 
existence of noisy signal in the Dybvig and Ross model. Assuming that a manager 
receives only informative signals implies that all changes in a portfolio are successful, 
which may tempt us into believing that a manager with a high portfolio turnover is a 
good manager.  
 
Grinblatt and Titman [1993] proposed to calculate the covariance between portfolio 
weights and subsequent portfolio returns. They showed that the covariance is also a 
measure of forecasting abilities: 




























    (9) 
 
The expression for the covariance measure is closely related to that of Jensen’s alpha. 







which is always smaller than one, since variances and the risk premium are positive. 
Compared to the covariance measure, Jensen’s alpha tends to underestimate the 
forecasting abilities.  
 
Since both the standard deviation of portfolio weights and the covariance measure are 
affected by the risk aversion of the trader, a better measure is the ratio of the 
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covariance over the standard deviation, which is a direct measure of the standard 





















       (10) 
This measure, which we call the ‘signal measure’ is a truly risk-adjusted measure of 





In order to investigate the consequences of noisy signals, we extend the Dybvig and 
Ross model by introducing a manager who trades on informative signals as well as 
noise. We refer to this trader as the informed noise trader. In order to derive a 
meaningful model, we assume that the informed noise trader is not able to separate the 
informative signal from the noisy signal.  
 
Following Dybvig and Ross [1985], we assume that the return on the risky security is 
determined by: 
uepr +=         (11) 
 
The portfolio manager believes that the return is determined by: 
**
i en s p r +++= ,       (12) 
 
where n is a noisy signal that is normally distributed with expectation 0 and standard 
deviation n. Since n is noisy, it is uncorrelated with r, although the manager beliefs 
otherwise. The signal s is uncorrelated with n. The actual realization will be based on 
i e s p r ++=        (13) 
 
Since the manager is not able to separate n from s he will trade on both signals 
simultaneously. The changes the manager’s return expectation is 
[ ] nsprEi ++=* ,       (14) 
 
and his perception of risk into 
2222
* nsrei
σσσσ −−= .       (15) 
 














= .       (16) 
Given the fact that the signal is a stochastic variable, the expected return of a manager 











= .       (17) 
 
Notice that this is an unconditional expression referring to the expected return as 
observed by an outside evaluator who cannot observe individual signals. Furthermore, 
the expression is almost identical to the expected return for the informed trader, with 
the exception of σe,i* which is smaller than σe,i. As a result, the expected return of the 
informed trader has a lower return than the informed noise trader with a similar 
informative signal and similar risk aversion. In other words, the informed noise trader 
beliefs that the risky security is less risky than the informed trader does, and therefore 
he assumes a larger position in the risky asset. In this sense, the informed noise 
trading is related to overconfidence2. 
 










=        (18) 
 
Since the standard deviation of the portfolio is also determined by the variance of the 
noisy signal, observing the standard deviation of portfolio weights is no longer enough 
to conclude that a manager is involved in informed trading. The challenge is to figure 
out the level of informed trading as compared to noise trading. This is important, as 
can be observed from the variance of the informed noise trader’s portfolio variance. 
 
The variance of the informed noise trader’s portfolio equals: 










=−  (19) 
 
This expression shows that the noise-trading component is responsible for an increase 
in the return volatility of the portfolio. The negative impact of noise trading in this 
model is the result of the increased return volatility of the portfolio. In order to 
measure the actual utility loss of an investor due to noise trading, it is necessary to 
                                                 
2
 Overconfidence is usually defined as the tendency of individuals to assign a larger reliability to their 
own forecasts than actually is justified.  
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measure the degree of noise trading. However, we might get an impression of the 
relevance of the problem by constructing an example with some plausible parameters. 
 







noise trader noise trader 
p 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 
r 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
s 0.00% 4.00% 2.83% 0.00% 
n 0.00% 0.00% 2.83% 4.00% 
e 20.0% 19.6% 19.6% 19.6% 
A 2 2 2 2 
E[xa] 50% 52% 52% 52% 
E[ra]3 2.0% 4.2% 3.1% 2.1% 
[ra] 10.0% 15.3% 14.9% 14.6% 
Sharpe 20.0% 27.2% 21.0% 14.3% 
 [xa] 0.0% 52.1% 52.1% 52.1% 
Turnover4 0.0% 58.8% 58.8% 58.8% 
 
In table 1, we present an example of the impact of noise trading on portfolio 
performance. The example involves four different investors, each acting on signals 
with the same magnitude. The investors are different as the information content of 
their signals is different. The first column presents an uninformed trader, who 
basically allocates his wealth to risky assets based on the risk premium. At a risk 
premium of 4%, a standard deviation of 20% and a constant of absolute risk aversion 
he allocates 50% of his wealth to the risky asset. His expected portfolio return is 2% 
with a standard deviation of 20%. Compare this to the informed trader who receives 
informative signals with a standard deviation of 4%. This trader will generate an 
additional return of 2.2% with a standard deviation of 15.3%. The corresponding 
portfolio turnover is equal to 58.8%. The third and the fourth column refer to noise 
traders who tend to believe that their signals have a standard deviation of 4%, 
although in reality they also trade on noise. The third column refers to a trader who 
trades equally on information as on noise, whereas the fourth column refers to a trader 
who trades on noise only. Obviously, the pure noise trader performs worst. Although 
his expected performance is slightly higher than that of the uninformed trader, the 
standard deviation of his portfolio is considerably higher than that of the uninformed 
trader. The informed noise trader takes a position somewhere in between. Although 
his expected return is considerable higher than the uninformed trader’s expected 
return, his Sharpe ratio is only slightly higher as compared to that of the uninformed 
                                                 
3
 In this table, we present the unconditional expected return and standard deviation as observed by an 
outside evaluator. The subsrcipt a refers to the results for the actual portfolio. 
4
 Turnover is calculated using the measure derived in the appendix. 
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trader. This is of course due to the increased volatility as compared to an investor who 
acts on an equally informative signal without noise. 
 
The model shows that for portfolio with similar portfolio turnover, it is possible to 
find large differences in performance due to differences in the level of noise present in 
the signals used by the manager.  
 
 
In the previous section we showed that noisy signals have a negative effect on the 
performance of an informed noise trader. In this section, we study the ability of 
performance measures to deal with noisy signal. First, we investigate the impact of 
noisy signal on regular performance measures. Next, we study two alternative 
methods for measuring the degree of noise trading in a portfolio. We face the 
challenge of deriving measures for the informative and the noisy signal in the context 













In this section we investigate the impact of informed noise trading on Jensen’s alpha, 
and the signal measure. In order to determine the effect of informed noise trading on 
the outcome of Jensen’s alpha, we start with its definition: 








−=      (20) 
 
The benchmark for the security market analysis is based on a passive benchmark, 
which implies a constant weight in the risky asset. It can be shown that the exact 
allocation to the benchmark portfolio is irrelevant for the outcome of the analysis. The 
expected return on the benchmark portfolio is  
[ ] pxrxE pp =  
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The variance of the benchmark equals ( ) ( )222var
iespp






















































,    (22) 
which is almost identical to the expression for the informed trader. Again the 
important difference is 22*
ii ee
σσ < . Due to his noisy signal, the manager perceives the 
risky asset as less risky than is actually justified. The effect is that the manager 
assumes more risk. So noise trading has the same effect on Jensen’s alpha as a lower 
coefficient of risk aversion.  
 
In section 2 we introduced the signal measure that corrects for the risk attitude of the 
portfolio manager. The signal measure was defined as the ratio of the covariance 
between weights and return over the standard deviation of portfolio weights. In the 
absence of noisy signals the signal measure is an unbiased measure of the forecasting 




































    (23) 
where sn σσγ = .  Since >0, the signal measure tends have a downward bias that is 
increasing with the level of noise trading in the portfolio. The relevance of these 
biases are illustrated in table 2, where we calculated the explained variance and the 
residual variance. 
 
In table 2 we present the outcomes for these measures that refer to the same example 
used for table 1. We compare the informed noise trader from table 1 with a new 
trader, which is an informed trader that acts on an informative signal only comparable 
to the informative signal of the informed noise trader. Comparing the outcomes of all 
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the performance measures for these two traders, we observe that the informed noise 
trader scores better on expected return, Jensen’s alpha and the covariance measure. 
These performance measures reward the noisy signal, even  though noise reduces the 
expected utility derived from those measures. Notable exception is the signal measure, 
which is negatively affected by the level of noise. 
 
Table 2: The impact of noisy signals on performance measures 
  (1) (2) 




p 4.00% 4.00% 
r 20.00% 20.00% 
s 2.83% 2.83% 










E[x] 51.02% 52.08% 
E[r] 3.06% 3.13% 
 [ra] 12.79% 14.91% 
 [xa] 36.08% 52.08% 
Jensen 0.98% 1.00% 
Covar 1.02% 1.04% 






a 52.04% 53.15% 
 
Depending on the objective of the measurement  it is possible to draw different 
conclusions. If the objective is to have an unbiased measure of the signal, none of 
these measures suffice, unless the observer can be sure that the portfolio manager acts 












An intuitive approach in separating the informative trading from noise trading is to 
estimate the following linear regression model:  
εβα ++= rx x ,       (24) 
 
where x is a vector of portfolio weights, and r is vector of security returns. In other 
words, we analyze the variance in portfolio weights and explain those by changed in 
future returns. The we associate informed trading with those variances in portfolio 
weights explained by the future returns (2 2r ) and the unexplained variance in 
portfolio weights to noise trading (2). In the remainder of this section we check 





σβ =         (25) 
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= .   (26) 
 
Noise trading does not significantly alter the covariance measure as compared to a 
model without noisy signals. It is still a measure of the forecasting skills of the 
portfolio manager, and the level of risk aversion of the portfolio manager also affects 
it. The standard deviation of security returns is 222


















=         (27) 
 
The variance in portfolio weight explained by the informative signal in regression 
equation (23) is:  






























































= . (28) 
The explained variance measure in this way is a downward biased estimator of noise 
trading since the ratio ( ) 222* rnei σσσ + is close to 1 for realistic parameter choices.  
 











=        (29) 
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Consistent with our objective, the contribution of the residual variance to total noise 
trading is determined by the size of the noisy signal. However, the second term of 
residual variance is also affected by the signal, so the residual variance is an upward 
biased measure of noise trading. These biases are also present in the correlation 
coefficient: 




























=        (31) 
 
However, the correlation coefficient has the advantage of being cleaned of the risk 
aversion parameter. In table 3 we present the outcomes for the analysis based on 
equation (24). 
 
Table 3: Regression analysis as a means to measure the level of noise trading 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 









p 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 
sigma r 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
sigma s 0.00% 4.00% 2.83% 2.83% 0.00% 
sigma n 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.83% 4.00% 








A 2 2 2 2 2 
x 0.0% 52.1% 25.5% 26.0% 0.0% 
Explained var 0.0% 1.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 
Resid var 0.0% 26.0% 12.8% 26.9% 27.1% 






xr N/A 4.0% 2.0% 2.0% 0.0% 
 
This table illustrates that this approach is not really useful for estimating the level of 
noise trading in the portfolio. The residual variance from equation (24) is much higher 
than can be explained by the actual level of noise trading, which would lead us to find 
no residual variance for the informed traders and a residual variance for the informed 
noise trader equal to .3%. The reason is of course that we explain the changes in 









In section 4.1 we showed that the signal measure underestimates the size of the 
informative signal in the presence of a noisy signal, and the degree of underestimation 
increases with the level of noise. In Plantinga [1999] we developed a performance 
measure that tries to overcome this problem of measuring the informative signal in the 
presence of noisy signals. We label this measure as the ‘noise corrected signal 













      (32) 
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This definition of the noise-corrected signal measure is consistent with the Dybvig 
and Ross model. However, the noise-corrected signal measure is not defined if the 
covariance between asset weights and returns is negative. Therefore we propose the 













≡ ,      (33) 
 
where  =1 if xr  0 and  =-1 if xr <0. 
 
With observable portfolio weights, both the covariance between weights and returns 
as well as the variance of portfolio weights can be estimated directly from the data. 
However, the sum of the variance of informative and the noisy signal is difficult to 
measure. Our solution is to measure the variance of the perceived signal as follows. 



















     (34) 
 
Calculate the standard deviation of this variable, which is equal to: 
221
nsq p
σσσ +=        (35) 
 
Multiplication of the variance of q with the risk premium results in an estimate of the 
total of the signals received by the manager, which can be used in equation (33) to 
get an unbiased estimate of the standard deviation of the informative signal. The 
noise component is the complement: 
.
2222
sqn p σσσ −=  
 
Applying this methodology to the examples presented in the earlier sections would 
yield exact estimates of the informative and the noisy signals. However, in empirical 
applications of this measure, the quality of the estimates will critically depend on the 
accuracy of the estimation of the risk premium that is used to derive the standard 
deviation of the total of the signals received by the portfolio manager. 
 
This is illustrated in table 4, where we first present the outcome of the noise corrected 
signal measure NS with the correct risk premium of 4%. Next we present the 
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outcomes of the NS with the incorrect risk premium of 6%, which leads us to believe 
that the manager acts on far bigger signals than he actually does. As a result, we are 
tempted to believe that all managers act on noise, even for those managers that trade 
on informative signals only. 
 










q 0.00% 100.00% 70.71% 100.00% 100.00% 
Correct risk premium     
Total signal 0.0% 4.00% 2.83% 4.00% 4.00% 
NS N/A 4.00% 2.83% 2.83% 4.00% 
n N/A 0.00% 0.00% 2.83%  
Risk premium equal to 6%     
Total signal 0.00% 6.00% 4.24% 6.00% 6.00% 
NS N/A 4.90% 3.46% 3.46% 0.00% 





In this paper, we started our analysis with the model of Dybvig and Ross [1985]. In 
this model an informed portfolio manager acts on an informative signal without noise. 
They used this model to show that Jensen’s alpha is negatively affected by the 
presence of the informative signal that eventually can lead to a failure in the 
identification of a successful portfolio manager. Elton and Gruber [1993] proposed to 
use the covariance between portfolio weights and subsequent returns to overcome this 
problem. We showed that the standard deviation of portfolio weights could also be 
used for the purpose of identifying successful portfolio managers. However, in the 
likely case of portfolio managers acting both on informative and noisy signals, the 
standard deviation is no longer sufficient. Therefore, we extended the model of 
Dybvig and Ross with noisy signals and analyzed the consequences of noisy signals 
for measuring portfolio performance. We showed that the main effect of noisy signals 
is due to the overconfidence of the portfolio manager in his own forecast, which result 
on average in higher allocations to risky assets. Since most performance measures are 
focused on the measurement of the signal, the noise-trading component is ignored. 
Consequently, the residual variance found in estimating Jensen’s alpha is usually 
attributed to the lack of diversification with a portfolio. However, this residual 
variance can be partly attributed to noise trading as well. Therefore, we propose to 
measure noise trading separately using two methods. The first method is to explain the 
current allocation to risky assets with its future return realization using linear 
regression. This method contains a slight bias that tends to overestimate the degree of 
noise trading. The second method called the noise-corrected signal measure 
overcomes this problem. This second measure critically relies on an adequate estimate 
5. !		
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of the risk premium. However, with accurate estimates of the risk premium we believe 
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There are no fund managers who report on the standard deviation of portfolio weights. 
However, most portfolio managers report the turnover in their portfolio, which is the 
sum of all transactions as a fraction of total portfolio value. In a static model, turnover 
is rather meaningless since the portfolio is bought at the start of the period, which 
means that in the practitioners’ definition turnover is equal to the value of the 
securities in the portfolio. However, we also could interpret our model as a dynamic 
model by imposing the assumption of stationarity on the stochastic variables. Now, 



























The standard deviation of portfolio weights is related to the expected value of 



















We now have a relation between the turnover in a portfolio in the manager’s signal 
structure.  
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